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A COMPARATIVE FAULT DEFENSE IN CONTRACT LAW 
Ariel Porat* 
Forthcoming 107 Michigan Law Review (2009) 
This Article calls for the recognition of a comparative fault defense in contract law. Part 
I sets the framework for this defense and suggests the situations in which it should apply. 
These situations are sorted under two headings: cases of non-cooperation and over-
reliance. Part II unfolds the main argument for recognizing the defense. It recommends 
applying the defense only in cases where cooperation or avoidance of over-reliance is 
low-cost. 
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Introduction 
In the 1970s, the comparative fault defense (“CFD”) in tort law began to spread 
across the United States,1 about thirty years after it became prevalent in the United 
Kingdom.2 Both legislatures and courts adopted this defense, with the latter applying it in 
tort cases on a daily basis. Today, few will call for the restoration of the doctrine which 
                                                                                                                                                 
* Alain Poher Professor of Law, Tel Aviv University. I thank Omri Ben-Shahar, Avraham 
Tabbach and Omri Yadlin for helpful discussions and comments and Dana Rothman-Meshulam for superb 
language editing. I also thank Adrienne Fowler and Daniel Rathbun from the Michigan Law Review for 
their very able editorial assistance.  
1. Several states had adopted it earlier. See Dan D. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 201, at 503–
04 (2000).  
2.  Winfield & Jolowicz on Torts 247-51 (16th ed., by W.V.H. Rogers, 2002).  
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preceded it: the contributory negligence defense. That defense enabled courts to either 
impose full liability on the injurer (when there was no contributory negligence) or leave 
the burden of harm completely on the victim’s shoulders (when there was contributory 
negligence).3 The CFD rejects this binary approach to fault, instead allowing 
apportionment of damages between the injurer and the contributorily negligent victim.  
Over the years, the CFD has infiltrated the contract law of many countries (such 
as Canada, the United Kingdom, and Israel), albeit primarily in cases where a party 
breached a contractual duty of care or in cases of concurrent tort and contract liability.4 
Yet, the same shift has been slow to occur in American contract law.5   
This Article calls for a reversal of this state of affairs and for the recognition of a 
CFD in American contract law. Part I begins by presenting the nature and scope of the 
advocated CFD. It also illustrates the categories of cases to which it should apply: cases 
where (1) efficiency requires that the promissee take steps during performance to reduce 
the probability of a breach (to cooperate) or to reduce his potential losses (to avoid over-
reliance) and (2) the cooperation or avoidance of over-reliance is low cost. Part II unfolds 
the main argument for applying the defense in contract law. According to this argument, 
                                                                                                                                                 
3. There were many variations of the contributory negligence defense that I cannot elaborate 
here. Other principles evolved alongside this defense (the most important being the “last clear chance”), 
which, under certain conditions, shifted loss back to the injurer. See Dobbs, supra note 1, §§ 199–200, at 
494–503 (describing the contributory negligence rule and its exceptions). 
4. On the United Kingdom, see the Law Commission No. 219, Contributory Negligence as a 
Defence in Contract ¶ 1.4. On Canada, see Smith v. McInnis, [1978] 91 D.L.R. (3d) 190 (S.C.C.) (Justice 
Pigeon, in the minority opinion, applied the CFD to a contractual case ). Lower courts in Canada have 
generally been willing to apply the CFD in all contractual case or in cases where parties breached a 
contractual duty of care. See, e.g., Doiron v. Caisse Populaire D’inkerman Ltee., [1985] 17 D.L.R. (4th) 
660 (N.B.). The Australian Supreme Court has refused to apply the CFD in contractual cases. Astley v. 
Austrust Ltd. (1999) HCA 6. The Israeli Supreme Court has applied the defense in contracts with no a 
priori limitations, C.A. 3912/90, Eximin SA v. Itel Style Ferarri, 47(4) P.D. 64 (1993) (available in both 
English and Hebrew). See also Ariel Porat, Contributory Negligence in Contract Law: Toward a Principled 
Approach, 28 U. B.C. L. Rev. 141, 141–43 (1994).  
5. For refusal to apply the CFD to contracts, see Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 
F.2d 1324 (1984); Danca v. Taunton Sav. Bank, 429 N.E.2d 1129 (1982); Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. 
v. Huff, 704 P.2d 372 (1985); Arcon Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 591 F. Supp. 15 (1983). For 
willingness to apply the defense to contracts, see Am. Mortgage Inv. Co. v. Hardin-Stockton Corp., 671 
S.W.2d 283 (1984); Elam v. Smithdeal Realty & Ins. Co., 109 S.E. 632 (1921); United States Fid. & Guar. 
Co. v. Frantl Indus., Inc., 241 N.W.2d 421 (1976). There is an increasing willingness to apply the CFD to 
implied warranties cases, see James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 11-8, at 
401–03 (4th ed. 1995), and infra discussion. See also John Barclay Phillips, Note: Out with the Old: 
Abandoning the Traditional Measurement of Contract Damages for a System of Comparative Fault, 50 Ala. 
L. Rev. 911 (1999) (suggesting the adoption of a comparative fault principle in contracts mainly for cases 
where both parties were in breach).  
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the CFD is warranted because it would provide the promissee with incentives to 
cooperate and rely efficiently while at the same time maintaining incentives for the 
promissor to perform the contract even if the promissee failed to fulfill his part. The CFD 
would also encourage the promissor to efficiently reduce the need for cooperation and 
avoiding over-reliance, thereby decreasing the losses from failures to cooperate or avoid 
over-reliance.   
I. The Nature and Scope of the Comparative Fault Defense 
The CFD should be available to a breaching party (“promissor”) against an 
aggrieved party (“promissee”) when the latter’s fault has contributed to his own losses.  
The promissee should be considered "at fault," and should shoulder part of the loss, when 
he fails to meet a legal burden to reduce his potential losses by cooperating with the 
promissor or avoiding over-reliance.  Below, I present eight categories of cases in which 
the promissee should be considered at fault and a CFD applied.  These are sorted under 
two headings: cases of non-cooperation and cases of over-reliance. In all eight categories, 
efficiency entails that the promissee take steps either to reduce the probability of breach 
or otherwise reduce his potential losses , and prevailing contract law mostly fails to 
provide him with adequate incentives to do so.  
A. Non-Cooperation 
In the cases that can be classified as instances of non-cooperation, the promissee 
failed to take steps to prevent or reduce the likelihood of breach during performance.  
Example 1 presents the case where a promissee fails to assist in performance by act or 
omission.  Example 2 presents the case where a promissee could have reasonably 
prevented the breach by clarifying for the promissor her legal rights and duties under the 
contract.  The next two examples concern the conveyance of information from the 
promissee to the promissor. In Example 3, the promissee fails to provide the promissor 
with information necessary for performance, while in Example 4 he fails to inform the 
promissor of the high potential losses he would incur in the event of breach. In both 
cases, the failure to provide information contributes to the breach of the contract. In the 
4 
 
fifth and final example, the promissee is responsible for creating apprehensions that he 
will not perform, thereby inducing a breach by the promissor. 
Example 1. Failing to assist in performance. A undertakes to construct a building 
for B. During the last stage of performance, B gives A’s employees confusing 
instructions as to the construction work required. In the end, there is a delay in the 
completion of performance; moreover, some of the construction work is found to be 
defective. Had B refrained from instructing A’s employees, the contract would have been 
adequately performed.6  
Prevailing contract law would take a binary approach to such situations: any 
losses due to non-performance would be shouldered in their entirety by either A or B. 
The choice between the two alternatives would hinge on the interpretation of the 
contract.7 Courts rarely opt for an intermediate solution that apportions damages between 
the parties.8  
Example 2. Failure to clarify misunderstandings. A is a subcontractor and B is a 
primary contractor.  They enter a contract for A to perform construction work and for B 
to pay installments at  different stages of the work. At a certain point in time, A argues 
that she has reached one of these payment stages and is therefore entitled to an 
installment. In fact, A is not entitled to any payment, since she failed to meet an 
additional condition stipulated by the contract. A is not aware of this additional condition 
because of an oversight on her part. B refuses to pay, stating that he is not obliged to do 
so under the contract and providing no other explanation. A then stops her work, causing 
loss to B. Only after a month, during which B stubbornly refuses to meet with A, does B 
explain to A why she was not entitled to payment.  
                                                                                                                                                 
6. This Example is an adaptation of Lesmeister v. Dilly, 330 N.W.2d 95 (1983), in which 
the court apportioned damages between the parties.  
7. See Restatement (Second) Contracts § 205 cmt. d (non-cooperation could be considered a 
breach of the duty of good faith). While Melvin Eisenberg agrees that cooperation should hinge on 
interpretation of the contract, he also suggests that unanticipated circumstances can give rise to a duty of 
cooperation, Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty to Rescue in Contract Law, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 648, 672–75 
(2002). For the same view, see Judge Posner’s opinion in AMPAT/Midwest, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 
896 F.2d 1035, 1041 (7th Cir. 1990) (“The parties to a contract are embarked on a cooperative venture, and 
a minimum of cooperativeness in the event unforeseen problems arise at the performance stage is required 
even if not an explicit duty of the contract.”). 
8. Lesmeister, 330 N.W.2d.  
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Traditional contract law would impose liability on A since she breached the 
contract. The fact that B could have easily clarified the misunderstanding and prevented 
the breach is taken to be irrelevant: after all, B is not A’s legal advisor, and it is A’s 
responsibility to fulfill her obligations under the contract. Under a different approach, 
which finds some support in the case law, when one party is aware of the other party’s 
ignorance of his legal rights and duties and can easily clarify them, he is under obligation 
to do so. He is not allowed to take deliberate advantage of the other party’s oversight.9 
The CFD is a third option: it makes both parties responsible for the losses in such cases.  
Example 3. Failure to provide information necessary for performance. A, a 
contractor, and B, the owner of a certain piece of land, enter a contract for the 
performance of construction work. Due to geological difficulties, there is a delay in 
performance that causes B substantial losses. It becomes evident, however, that B knew 
about these obstacles at an early stage (although not prior to entering into the contract 
with A).  Had he revealed this to A in due time, the delay could have been prevented.  
Contract law imposes a limited duty of disclosure at the contract formation stage. 
In shaping this duty, courts balance the interest of the party possessing information to use 
it for his own benefit against the interest of the other party not to be misled.10 Contract 
law does not impose any duty to disclose information at the performance stage.  
However, one might expect an even broader disclosure duty at this stage since disclosing 
the information necessary for performance, especially when it is costless (or nearly so), 
increases the surplus of the contract without distributional effects.11 As I argue in Part II, 
under certain conditions, applying the CFD is a better solution than imposing a duty of 
disclosure. 
                                                                                                                                                 
9. Market Street Ass’n P’ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991). In this case, one 
party refused to fulfill her duties and the other party could have easily corrected the mistake. Id. Judge 
Posner ruled that the contracting parties bore a duty not to take deliberate advantage of each others’ 
oversights concerning their rights and duties under the contract. Id. For a thorough discussion of this case, 
see Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 667–70.  
10. Melvin Eisenberg, Disclosure in Contract Law, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1645 (2003) (discussing 
both efficiency and moral considerations in shaping the duty of disclosure).  
11. See Hugh Collins, Implied Duty to Give Information During Performance of Contracts, 
55 Mod. L. Rev. 556 (1992) (advocating recognition of an implied duty to give information during 
performance).  
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Example 4. Failure to warn of a high potential loss. A, a carrier, undertakes to 
ship a crank shaft from B’s mill for repair and to bring it back in one week’s time. A 
instead brings the shaft back after 2 weeks, and this results in high consequential losses to 
B, who could not find a substitute shaft. At the time of contracting, the parties were 
aware of a small risk that a substitute shaft would not be available.   A week later it had 
became clear to B, but not to A, that this risk had materialized. Had B conveyed this 
information to A on time, A would have taken costly precautions to ensure that he would 
return the shaft on time and would have prevented the breach.12 
Under the Hadley v. Baxendale principle, A would be liable for B’s losses, since 
the non-availability of a substitute shaft was foreseeable at the time of contracting. Yet, 
had B informed A of his potentially high losses when he realized the non-availability of a 
substitute shaft, the inefficient breach would have been avoided.13 One way to provide 
promissees with incentives to convey such information would be to deprive B of his 
entitlement to damages.14 A less extreme approach would be to make the CFD available 
to A and reduce his liability accordingly.15  
Example 5. Creating apprehensions. B constructs a building for A. At a certain 
point in time, B brings heavy equipment to the construction site and places it on a 
concrete floor that was poured only a few days earlier. At A’s request, the equipment is 
removed to avoid damaging the floor. A suspects that it is already damaged, however, 
and demands its replacement. B refuses. A forbids B from continuing the construction 
                                                                                                                                                 
12. The inspiration for this example is, of course, Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 
(1854). 
13. The following illustrates numerically the principles behind Example 4: Assume at the 
time of contracting that the probability of losing $1000 was .1, yielding an expected loss of $100, but that a 
week after contracting, the probability of loss increased to 1, yielding an expected loss of $1000. Assume 
now that by investing $500 in precautions, A could prevent the breach. So long as A assumes the expected 
loss to be $100, he won’t make this investment, whereas if he is aware that it has risen to $1000 he will 
make it. Since efficiency requires making the investment, efficiency also dictates that B should convey the 
information regarding his high potential loss to A.  
14. Others have supported the use of this solution in analogous cases.  See Charles J. Goetz 
& Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 Va. 
L. Rev. 967, 1012–14 (1983); Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 670–72.  
15. Another situation in which the Hadley v. Baxendale principle would allow recovery, and 
where applying the CFD could be valuable, is one in which the high potential losses are foreseeable 
(objectively) but unforeseen (subjectively) by the promissor at both the time of contracting and later on. 
Here, too, if the promissee realizes during performance that the promissor is unaware of the high potential 
loss entailed by a breach, efficiency requires conveying the information to the promissor. The CFD would 
provide incentives to achieve this result.  
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work and both suffer losses. It later becomes evident that the concrete floor was not 
damaged and that B’s placement of the heavy equipment on the floor was no more than a 
minor breach that had not warranted A's repudiation. It also becomes evident that B could 
have assured A that the floor was not damaged or, alternatively, that it would be repaired 
if necessary. Had B provided such assurances, A would not have repudiated.16 
Under traditional contract law, A should be found liable for breach of contract—
her suspicions of damage are her own problem and do not affect B’s rights and duties 
under the contract. In contrast, the modern approach, as reflected through the 
Restatement, allows a party who has reasonable grounds to suspect that the other party 
will not perform his or her contractual obligations to demand adequate assurance of due 
performance.  If the party fails to provide assurances, the requesting party can treat the 
contract as having been repudiated.17 The Restatement does not explicitly discuss cases in 
which the apprehensive party responds by breaching the contract (as in our Example).  
However, there is an implicit assumption that that party would be considered in breach 
and liable for the ensuing consequences. As Part II explains, a better solution for 
Example 5 would be apportionment of damages under the CFD.18 
B. Over-Reliance 
There are three categories of cases that can be classified as instances of over-
reliance—where efficiency would have required the promissee to restrain his reliance, but 
he failed to do so.  In the sixth example, the promissee engages in reliance despite 
knowing the promisor will likely breach. In the next example, the promissee has no 
concrete reason to suspect an imminent breach, but his reliance prior to the breach is 
nonetheless unreasonable. In the last example, the promissee unreasonably assumes that 
the contract was performed and thus fails to minimize his expected losses.  
                                                                                                                                                 
16. This Example is an adaptation of Carfield & Sons v. Cowling, 616 P.2d 1008 (Co. 1980). 
There, the court stated that in order to avoid liability, “[A] was obligated to request adequate assurance of 
performance. If [B] then refused to provide that assurance, [A] could treat the contract as terminated.”  
17. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251.  
18. For an argument in favor of apportioning damages in the cases depicted by Example 5, 
see W.F. Young, Half Measures, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 19 (1981). 
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Example 6. Failure to restrain reliance in the face of a concrete risk of breach. A 
agrees to sell his house to B. As the time of delivery of possession approaches, there are 
signs of a substantial risk that A will not make timely delivery because A’s lessee is 
refusing to vacate the premises.  Even though B is well aware of this risk, he enters into a 
contract with a contractor to refurnish the house starting on the day set for delivery.  He 
also incurs expenses advertising the house for rent. In the end, A breaches due to late 
delivery, and B suffers losses due to forfeiting the contractor’s deposit and his advertising 
expenses. These losses would have been prevented had B waited to see whether the 
contract would be adequately performed. 
B’s reliance on the contract was unreasonable since the expected losses of 
reliance exceeded the expected gains of reliance. But since contract law does not sanction 
for over-reliance, B could externalize his costs and internalize his gains. Consequently, 
the risk that he would over-rely was a substantial one. Note that Example 6 is not a case 
of anticipatory breach, where the mitigation of damages defense would apply19 and thus 
provide efficient incentives for B to restrain his reliance. In situations represented by 
Example 6, then, the application of the CFD would unambiguously improve B’s 
incentives relative to those currently provided by contract law. The CFD would also be 
superior to the mitigation of damages defense, as will be explained in Part II. 
Example 7. Failure to restrain reliance when there is no concrete risk of breach. 
A undertakes to guard B’s house, where valuable goods are stored. However, B fails to 
activate the alarm system. A breaches the contract by neglecting to guard the house.  As a 
result, thieves steal B’s goods and inflict bodily injury on B. Had B activated the alarm 
system, all losses would have been prevented. B also could have taken other 
precautionary measures to reduce the risk of theft.20  
Even if B had no concrete reason to suspect that A would breach the contract, it 
could still have been unreasonable for B to rely only on A for protection. In order to 
determine whether his reliance was unreasonable, it is necessary to consider the value of 
                                                                                                                                                 
19. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350 cmt. f. 
20. The Australian Supreme Court considered a similar situation.  While refusing to apply the 
CFD to contracts, it maintained that "[a] plaintiff may be guilty of contributory negligence . . . even if the 
“very purpose” of the duty owed by the defendant is to protect the plaintiff’s property."  
Astley, (1999) HCA, at 23.  
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the assets, the risk of theft and bodily injury, the capabilities of A as a guard, the cost of 
additional precautionary measures and their effectiveness, and so on. Applying the CFD 
if B's reliance was unreasonable would provide incentives to similarly situated 
promissees to make reasonable efforts to protect their property. Conditioning A’s liability 
on B’s activating the alarm system or taking other precautionary measures would be an 
inefficient solution, as will be clarified in Part II. 
Example 8. Relying on the mistaken belief that the contract has been adequately 
performed. A constructs a heating system for B’s business. The heater malfunctions due 
to A’s failure to fulfill her contractual obligations, and B suffers property losses. Due to 
these losses, B is unable to perform third party contracts and suffers additional losses. A 
few hours prior to the malfunction, there were signs of something going wrong.  A 
reasonable person could have inferred the impending malfunction and taken steps to 
avoid losses.21  
Here, as in the sixth and seventh examples, the mitigation of damages defense 
does not apply because B was not aware of the breach at the relevant points in time.22 The 
CFD provides a compromise between the two extreme solutions of either A or B bearing 
all the losses.  And indeed, some courts have allowed the defense in similar situations—
as when the promissor breached an implied warranty and consequential losses ensued.23 
II. The Argument for Adopting the Comparative Fault Defense 
A. Setting the Stage 
Though several arguments have been raised against recognizing a CFD as a 
general defense in contract law,24 the most significant one is that the CFD would impair 
                                                                                                                                                 
21. This Example is an adaptation of Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prod., 572 
S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978). In that case, the plaintiff suffered losses due to a fire from a malfunctioning 
heater. The defendants, who had manufactured, designed, and installed the heater, were found liable for 
breach of implied warranties of fitness and suitability. The court applied the CFD and reduced damages.  It 
found that the plaintiff had been contributorily negligent in not shutting down the heater despite warnings 
about the impending hazard. 
22. Restatement (Second) Contracts § 350 cmt. f. 
23. See, e.g., Signal Oil & Gas Co., 572 S.W.2d; Karl v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 331 
N.W.2d 456 (Mich. 1982) (where the Michigan supreme court applied a comparative fault defense).  
24. For a discussion and refutation of these arguments, see Ariel Porat, Comparative Fault in 
Contract Law (1997) (Hebrew). 
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the promissee’s reliance and planning abilities.25  Were a CFD applicable, the argument 
runs, the promissee could no longer be certain of full compensation for an unfulfilled 
contractual promise. He could no longer “sit and wait” until the promissor fulfilled her 
contractual obligation, but would have to assist, supervise and take precautionary 
measures with regard to either the other party’s performance or his own potential losses.  
Yet, I disagree.  In the analysis below, I posit that under certain conditions, most 
contractual parties would benefit ex ante from the availability of a CFD, making it an 
efficient default rule for contract law. If my argument holds, the reliance and planning 
argument unravels: even if the promissee’s ex post reliance and planning abilities are 
impaired, this does not justify rejecting the CFD since it is consistent with both parties’ 
ex ante interests.  
My analysis assumes the following sequence of events: first, the promissee 
observes the behavior of the promissor or some part of it; second, the promissee responds 
by taking or not taking steps to cooperate or avoid over-reliance; third, the promissor 
observes the response of the promissee; and fourth, the promissor responds by 
performing or not. The analysis also assumes that the relevant behaviors are verifiable—
in other words, that they can be proven in court. Finally, it is assumed that renegotiation 
is costly and the parties would prefer their rights and duties to be regulated from the 
outset. 
B. Non-Cooperation  
1. When Should Cooperation Be the Default Rule?  
Below, I argue that cooperation should be the default rule where cooperation is 
low cost. But before explaining why, let me clarify what I mean by “costs of 
cooperation” and by "high cost" and "low cost" cooperation. Costs of cooperation do not 
refer only to the costs of executing the cooperation; they also include the costs associated 
with monitoring the promissor’s performance to anticipate a need to cooperate, as well as 
the costs necessary to infer from the circumstances that a need to cooperate arose.  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
25. See Law Commission No. 219, Contributory Negligence as a Defence in Contract ¶¶ 4.5–
4.7; Ariel Porat, The Contributory Negligence Defence and the Ability to Rely on the Contract, 111 Law Q. 
Rev. 228 (1995).  
11 
 
two latter costs are often far more substantial than the former type, as most of the 
examples discussed in Section I.A. illustrate. Thus, in Example 2 (clarifying 
misunderstandings), the costs of clarifying for the promissor that she was about to breach 
the contract were close to zero; however, in order to know that such a clarification was 
needed, the promissee would have had to monitor the promissor’s behavior and infer such 
a need when it arose. These costs of monitoring performance and inferring a need to 
cooperate, even if not high, are not nil.  
There is no bright line rule for distinguishing between high-cost and low-cost 
cooperation. While it is relatively easy to conceive of the two poles, it is difficult to draw 
the line between them. The costliness of cooperation is certainly a function of the surplus 
created by the contract: cooperative efforts that are high-cost in the context of a contract 
for renting an apartment could be low-cost in the context of a contract for performing a 
huge construction project. For the purposes of this Article, I define “low-cost 
cooperation” as any cooperation that a reasonable person would not consider to 
materially affect the division of the contract surplus.  I define all other forms of 
cooperation as “high-cost."  
a. High-Probability, High-Cost Cooperation 
When the parties to a contract anticipate a high probability that the promissor will 
need the promissee's cooperation during performance and the costs of cooperation are 
high, they tend to address this need in their contract. The parties can set either a burden or 
a duty of cooperation for the promissee, making it so that non-cooperation will result in 
deprivation of the promissee’s entitlement to damages (a burden) or the promissee’s 
liability for the promissor’s losses (a duty). In contrast, silence on this matter can indicate 
that the parties did not intend to impose a high-cost burden or duty of cooperation on the 
promissee, at least when the need for the promissee's cooperation is anticipated at a high 
level of probability.  
The question that arises, however, is whether, in order to save transaction costs, 
there should be a default rule imposing a burden or duty of cooperation when cooperation 
is of high probability, high cost and efficient. I believe that the answer is no.  
12 
 
First, it is often hard to know whether the parties would have preferred high-cost 
cooperation and, if so, to what extent. Occasionally, different modes of cooperation are 
available and there is no clearly preferable choice among them. Moreover, the need to 
cooperate and the efficiency of doing so could be debatable and could fluctuate from case 
to case.26  
Second, when cooperation is high-probability and high-cost, it becomes part of 
the substance of the exchange. From both positive and normative points of view, default 
rules do not and should not regulate the substance of the exchange but only its ancillary 
terms; the substance of the exchange should be left for the parties to regulate.  
Third, on many occasions the promissee could refuse to undertake a burden or 
duty of high-cost cooperation—or the parties could deem it inefficient—because of the 
parties’ asymmetric information and control regarding the conditions relevant to 
cooperation. Typically, the promissor knows more than the promissee about the 
promissor’s ability to perform and about her expected need for the promissee’s 
cooperation. The promissor will try to underestimate the likelihood of this need arising 
while negotiating the contract, and the promissee, well aware of this fact, will be 
reluctant to bear a burden or duty of high-probability and high-cost cooperation. But 
more importantly, in addition to possessing better information, the promissor often has 
better control over the conditions giving rise to a need for cooperation. Knowing that the 
promissee bears a burden or duty to cooperate, the promissor may try to manipulate the 
promissee or to maneuver events so that greater cooperation is required than efficiency 
would dictate.27 Often, such inefficient behavior is unverifiable and therefore cannot be 
deterred.28 
                                                                                                                                                 
26. The parties will sometimes prefer to leave the question of cooperation open for future 
negotiation. However, that can only be done when the costs of renegotiation are not prohibitively high.  
27. Sometimes the parties may overcome this hurdle by imposing a duty (or burden) of 
cooperation on the promissee and a duty for the promissor to compensate the promissee for his costs. But 
since this solution could only work for some cases, it cannot serve as a default rule.  
28. In different terminology, under certain circumstances, the promissee can be the cheapest 
cost avoider of the breach, while the promissor is the cheapest cost avoider of the circumstances giving rise 
to the need to avoid the breach.  
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All three of these reasons are compelling grounds for a default rule under which 
there is no burden or duty of high-cost and highly-probable cooperation and under which 
the parties are left to regulate cooperation as they see fit.29  
b. Low-Probability, Low-Cost Cooperation 
However, a different situation arises when one or more low-probability 
contingencies that require low-cost cooperation are expected to transpire. Regulating any 
low-probability contingency by contract yields high, even prohibitive, transaction costs 
for the parties, thereby encouraging them to leave many contingencies unregulated. When 
the potential cooperation is low-cost, the argument that default rules should not regulate 
the substance of the exchange also collapses: it is precisely in such cases that default 
rules are most needed. And the above-discussed issue of asymmetric information and 
control over the circumstances giving rise to the need of cooperation is decidedly less 
acute.  Therefore, given that specific low-cost cooperative behavior on the part of the 
promissee is typical in many contractual settings, it is desirable to shape a clear default 
rule regulating such behavior. The five categories of cases represented by the five 
examples discussed in Part I.A. could set the framework for five sets of default rules 
regulating repeat low-cost and efficient cooperative modes of behavior by promissees.  
Example 1 (assistance) can be used to illustrate this. In that Example, the owner 
failed to cooperate by issuing confusing instructions. While not necessarily costless, such 
cooperation would not have been high-cost.  But many parties would not regulate such 
contingencies when the default rule is non-cooperation.  Even when cooperation is 
efficient, regulating these kinds of contingencies would involve high transaction costs 
that the parties would not willingly shoulder. A default rule encouraging cooperation 
would be desirable in such cases.  And the same conclusion holds with respect to the 
other examples presented in Part II.A.  In most of those examples, a substantial part of 
the cooperation costs were not related to executing the cooperation, but rather, to 
monitoring the promissor’s performance and inferring from the circumstances that 
cooperation was needed. The latter types of costs are typically “fixed”. The magnitude of 
                                                                                                                                                 
29. For a general argument against cooperative default rules in contracts, see Robert E. Scott, 
A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. Leg. Stud. 597 (1990).  
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fixed costs cannot be significantly affected by the promissor's manipulations and 
maneuvers, and the promissee will therefore be more willing to bear them in the first 
place.  Therefore, in all the examples, and especially when most of the cooperation costs 
are fixed, efficiency mandates that the promissee should assume a burden or a duty of 
cooperation. 
c. High-Probability, Low-Cost Cooperation 
The crucial need for a low-cost, low-probability cooperation default rule does not 
preclude a default rule requiring low-cost, high-probability cooperation. Indeed, even for 
high-probability contingencies, a default rule could operate efficiently by reducing the 
parties’ transaction costs.  Suppose that in Example 5 (apprehensions), the parties 
anticipate a high probability that the owner will be uncertain, at different stages of the 
work, as to whether performance is adequately executed, but that assurance of 
performance will not be high-cost. With a default rule of non-cooperation, the parties will 
probably regulate cooperation in their contract for such a contingency. However, a 
cooperation default rule would save them the transaction costs of negotiating and drafting 
a contract provision.  
d. Low-Probability, High-Cost Cooperation 
The case of low-probability, high-cost cooperation is different, and the main 
reason pertains to the above-mentioned problem with asymmetric information and 
control. A burden or duty of cooperation could spur the promissor to take advantage of 
the promissee by creating conditions in which cooperation is required too often and 
inefficiently. The fact that cooperation is high-cost could provide good grounds for 
rejecting a rule of cooperation from the outset.30  
2. The Remedy 
One way to encourage low-cost cooperation in the cases depicted by Examples 1 
to 5 is to impose a duty of cooperation on the promissee—or a full burden of cooperation, 
                                                                                                                                                 
30. But if most of the costs are fixed and their magnitudes not dependent on the promissor’s 
behavior, a different conclusion could be warranted. See supra Section II.B.1.b.  
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which has a similar effect when he is the only party expected to incur losses —with the 
result that if he fails to fulfill his duty, he will shoulder all losses from a breach. When the 
promissee expects to internalize the entirety of the costs stemming from his inefficient 
non-cooperation, he will tend to cooperate. But there is still a flaw in this solution: it 
provides no incentive for the promissor to perform efficiently if the promissee fails to 
cooperate. In an ideal world, if the promissee expected to internalize all the costs of his 
inefficient non-cooperation, he would always cooperate efficiently; but in our non-ideal 
world, he will often fail to do so.  The parties may therefore be willing to give the 
promissor incentives to perform in the event that the promissee fails to cooperate.  But 
placing full liability (or full burden) on the promissee will not achieve this goal.  
Just as full promissor liability creates a moral hazard for the promissee, full 
promissee liability creates a moral hazard for the promissor. Example 3 (providing 
information necessary for performance) can illustrate such an outcome. In that Example, 
the owner failed to convey geological information to the contractor. It could still have 
been efficient to perform on time without knowledge of this information. But if the 
contractor knew that the owner would bear all the losses since he had failed to apprise 
him, she might inefficiently refrain from performing on time.  
The CFD could solve this problem. Since the defense apportions damages 
between the parties, it leaves substantial incentives for the promissor to perform even 
when the promissee has failed to cooperate. Thus, in Example 3, the contractor would 
have incentives to perform on time even if he did not receive the information at an early 
stage and even if he knew of the promissee’s omission. These incentives are admittedly 
imperfect since the CFD forces the promissor to bear less than the amount of the full 
losses generated by the breach. But, given the importance of the promissee’s cooperation, 
this is a price worth paying.  
There is yet another cost of using the CFD over a duty (or full burden) of 
cooperation: the loss of perfectly efficient incentives for the promissee to cooperate 
(which exist when he fully internalizes all the costs of the breach). However, this cost is 
trivial in the context of low-cost cooperation, where much less than the threat of full 
liability is necessary to induce the promissee to cooperate. In such cases, it is typically 
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sufficient to threaten the promissee with an expected burden (or liability) that is higher 
than his costs of cooperation even if it is much lower than the costs of non-cooperation. 
Using Example 3 to demonstrate this, much less than the threat of full liability is 
necessary to incentivize the owner to convey the geological information to the 
contractor.31  Granted, there is still the potential for strategic behavior on the part of the 
promissee: aware that the promissor has sufficient incentives to perform even if 
cooperation is not rendered, the promissee may choose from the outset not to cooperate. 
But this is not a major concern.  As illustrated by Examples 1 to 5, the promissee 
typically knows there is significant risk that the promissor will not perform in the absence 
of cooperation. In light of this knowledge and given the low-cost burden of cooperation, 
the promissee will cooperate because he expects to bear part of his losses.  To illustrate 
with Example 3, the risk that the owner will not convey the geological information to the 
contractor to save cooperation costs is very low.  He must realize that the failure to 
convey this information would not only make performance more costly but could also 
lead to a breach with him bearing partial consequences.  
In addition to providing efficient incentives for the promissee to cooperate and for 
the promissor to perform when the promissee has failed to cooperate, the CFD offers at 
least one other important advantage over a duty or full burden rule.  It provides the 
promissor with more efficient incentives to reduce the expected losses from breach before 
the need for cooperation arises, and this is crucial because of the promissor’s superior 
information and control over the circumstances giving rise to the need for cooperation.  If 
the promissee bears all the costs of non-cooperation as a duty rule would mandate, then 
the promissor will covertly, inefficiently, and too often create situations in which the 
promissee is required to cooperate. Given that cooperation is low-cost, it would seem this 
is an insignificant risk. But since the outcome is sometimes a high-cost failure to 
cooperate, reducing the probability of the need to cooperate—even if cooperation is not 
high-cost—could be cost-justified. The CFD, as opposed to its alternatives, provides 
                                                                                                                                                 
31. But sometimes the promissee may refrain from cooperating in order to induce a breach 
and find a way out of the contract; placing an expected burden on him, equivalent to the costs of 
cooperation, would not be sufficient to efficiently deter him. 
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incentives to the promissor not only to perform when cooperation has been withheld, but 
also to reduce the need for cooperation in the first place.32 
The following numerical example illustrates the incentivizing effects of the CFD 
in such situations. Assume that, without cooperation, the probability of breach is .5 and 
the loss the promissee is expected to incur due to the breach is $80, yielding an expected 
loss of $40. Also assume that, with the promissee’s cooperation, which costs him $2, the 
probability of breach is expected to be reduced to .25, with losses remaining at $80, 
thereby yielding expected losses of $20. Under such circumstances, cooperation is 
efficient. If the CFD is applied and the promissee failed to cooperate and a breach 
occurred, it would be sufficient that he be made to bear only $5 of the total $80 loss. This 
would create an ex ante threat of $2.5 for the promissee (.5 x $5) and would incentivize 
him to cooperate from the outset. At the same time, it would leave most of the costs of 
the breach to be borne by the promissor. This would typically provide her with sufficient 
incentives to efficiently perform if the promissee failed to cooperate and to reduce the 
need to cooperate in the first place.  
To conclude, in cases of low-cost cooperation, non-cooperation should lead to 
reduced damages under the CFD. Ideally, from an efficiency perspective, this reduction 
should be no more than the minimum amount necessary to provide the promissee with 
incentives to cooperate.  
C. Over-Reliance  
1. When Should Avoiding Over-Reliance Be the Default Rule?  
a. High-Probability, High-Cost Avoidance of Over-Reliance 
When over-reliance is anticipated at a high level of probability and its avoidance 
is high-cost,33 the parties are expected to regulate the extent of reliance in the contract if 
                                                                                                                                                 
32. Note that instead of leaving some unrecoverable losses on the promissee’s shoulders (as 
the CFD mandates), the law could also make him liable for some of the promissor’s losses (as though the 
promissor and promissee were both responsible for the breach and its consequences). However, the latter 
solution would add the administrative costs of measuring the promissor’s losses. 
33. The distinction between high-cost and low-cost over-reliance is analogous to that applied 
to high-cost and low-cost cooperation. See supra Section II.B.1.  
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they want it controlled at all. They can regulate it directly when over-reliance is verifiable 
or indirectly when not. Indirect regulation can take the form of a liquidated damages 
clause that sets the damages the promissee is entitled to in the event of breach. In such a 
case, the promissee would internalize both the costs and benefits of his reliance and 
would rely efficiently.34 A default rule regulating reliance is not suitable for cases of a 
high probability of over-reliance when avoiding that over-reliance is high-cost.  This is so 
for the same reasons that a default rule is not suited for regulating high-probability and 
high-cost cooperation cases.35 
b. Low-Probability, Low-Cost Avoidance of Over-Reliance 
In cases of low-probability and low-cost avoidance of over-reliance, however, a 
default rule that encourages efficient reliance could be justified.36 Let us return to 
Example 6 (concrete risk of breach). There could be many contingencies in which a risk 
of breach on the part of the seller of the house could emerge. Regulating each and every 
such contingency would entail high transaction costs and most parties would not even 
attempt to do so.  Thus, developing default rules adapted to various types of over-reliance 
could be the best solution. Examples 6 to 8 could serve as paradigmatic cases from which 
more detailed and nuanced default rules could evolve. 
c. Other Situations in the Avoidance of Over-Reliance 
So as to avoid unnecessary repetitiveness, I will not discuss at any length the 
desirability or undesirability of setting a default rule for cases of high-probability, low-
cost avoidance of over-reliance and for cases of low-probability, high-cost avoidance. 
The arguments regarding the desirability of default rules in the corresponding contexts of 
                                                                                                                                                 
34. Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 Cal. 
L. Rev. 1, 14–15 (1985). Note that this solution does not work for non-cooperation cases. On handling 
over-reliance, see Richard Craswell, Performance, Reliance, and One-Sided Information, 18 J. Leg. Stud. 
365, 367–68 (1989) (suggesting a rule under which the promissor would state the probability of a breach 
and on which the promissee would rely accordingly). For various doctrines in prevailing contract law that 
reduce over-reliance, see George Cohen, Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1225 (1994). 
35. See supra Section I.B.1.a.  
36. For the argument that over-reliance is not a severe or prevalent problem in contract law, 
see Melvin Eisenberg, Expectation Damages and the Theory of Over-Reliance, 54 Hastings L.J. 1335 
(2003). But note that the cases represented by Example 6 are considered by Eisenberg to be “out of the 
realm of over-reliance,” id. at 1346.  
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cooperation apply here as well. It suffices to say that a default rule for high-probability, 
low-cost avoidance of over-reliance would be efficiency-justified since it would save 
transaction costs; in contrast, a default rule for low-probability, high-cost avoidance of 
over-reliance would be unwarranted because of the promissor’s superior information and 
control.37 
2. The Remedy 
One way to encourage low-cost avoidance of over-reliance would be to deprive 
the promissee of damages for the reliance losses he inefficiently increased or failed to 
reduce.  The buyer in Example 6 (concrete risk of breach), for example, would not be 
compensated for his deposit or his advertising costs because they resulted from 
unreasonable reliance. This solution is tantamount to applying the mitigation of damages 
defense at the stage before a known breach transpires. It is flawed, however, in that it 
would reduce the incentives of the promissor to efficiently perform: she would know that 
she would not have to shoulder any of the promissee’s over-reliance losses. In Example 
6, given the buyer’s over-reliance, efficiency requires that the seller take extra steps to 
deliver on time. But if the seller knows she is exempt from any liability for the buyer’s 
over-reliance losses, she will make less-than-efficient efforts to perform. 
By contrast, applying the CFD would result in a reduction of the promissee’s 
damages for losses resulting from his over-reliance. This would provide the promissee 
with efficient incentives to undertake low-cost avoidance of over-reliance.  No less 
important, it would create greater incentives for the promissor to perform efficiently 
when there is a known risk or a tangible instance of promissee over-reliance.  Relative to 
situations in which the promissor shoulders all of the losses, as is the case under 
prevailing contract law, the CFD would create somewhat weaker incentives for the 
promissor to perform efficiently. But this is a price worth paying to improve the 
promissee’s incentives to avoid over-reliance, and the point is well illustrated by 
Example 6 (concrete risk of breach).  Under the CFD, the buyer would be expected to 
bear some of the advertising costs and the cost of the forfeited deposit. This would 
                                                                                                                                                 
37. See supra Section II.B.1.d. 
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provide him with incentives to delay reliance until he saw whether the contract was 
performed on time. But if the buyer were to inadvertently over-rely, the seller would have 
incentives to take extra precautions, ensure timely performance, and prevent over-
reliance losses.38 
As was the case with non-cooperation, the asymmetry in information and control 
over the conditions generating a need to avoid over-reliance also gives reasons to prefer 
the CFD over a rule that leaves all over-reliance costs on the promissee’s shoulders. 
Unlike that latter rule, the CFD incentivizes the promissor to reduce the need to avoid 
over-reliance. The advantage to this is that it ameliorates the risk of high-cost over-
reliance, which can result when the promissee fails to avoid over-reliance.39 
In sum, in cases of low-cost avoidance of over-reliance, like in cases of low-cost 
cooperation, the CFD is preferable to a binary approach that leaves one party with the 
entire burden of loss. Here, as well, from an efficiency perspective, the burden borne by 
the promissee should amount to no more than the minimum necessary to provide him 
with incentives for efficient reliance. 
Conclusion 
This Article calls for recognition of a comparative fault defense in contract law. It 
presents the categories of cases to which this defense should apply and argues that a 
precondition for its application is low-cost promissee cooperation or low-cost promissee 
avoidance of over-reliance. Of course, this is not the only condition courts should 
consider.  Other relevant factors affecting the desirability of the CFD include (1) the 
benefit to derive from the expected cooperation or avoidance of over-reliance, (2) the 
extent of asymmetry in the information and control the parties wield over the conditions 
giving rise to the need to cooperate or avoid over-reliance, and (3) the probability of that 
need arising. The higher the benefit from cooperation or avoidance of over-reliance, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
38. Knowing the chance of performance increase if he over-relies, the promissee may 
increase his reliance more when the promissor is aware of his over-reliance.  This possibility 
notwithstanding, when avoidance of over-reliance is low-cost and the risk of breach is significant in spite of 
his over-reliance, the promissee will prefer to restrain his reliance.   
39. This argument seems to be more persuasive in the context of Example 6 than in 
Examples 7 and 8, since asymmetric information and control are more operative in the former.  
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lesser the asymmetry in information and control, and the lower the probability of the need 
to cooperate or avoid over-reliance materializing, the stronger the case for the CFD.  
While the Article does not present an in-depth consideration of the criteria for 
apportioning damages under the CFD, the discussion does imply that courts should assign 
the promissee no more than the minimum burden necessary to efficiently incentivize him 
to cooperate or avoid over-reliance. This would often result in imposing a greater share of 
losses on the promissor.40  
Despite this Article’s primary focus on efficiency, the potential fairness appeal of 
the CFD is also apparent throughout the discussion: in all categories of cases to which the 
defense would apply, the promissee has unreasonably brought his losses upon himself, 
making both parties responsible for them.  From a fairness perspective, it would seem 
that they should share the losses. But establishing an independent fairness rationale for 
the CFD requires that the promissee’s duty or burden to either cooperate or avoid over-
reliance be grounded on fairness considerations.41  It is also necessary to establish that 
fairness implies the promissee’s failure to meet his duty or burden should not release the 
promissor from her primary obligations under the contract and that it justifies 
apportioning the damages between the parties as such. While I have not tried to respond 
to the fairness challenge in this Article, it deserves further consideration and 
exploration.42 
It has only been forty years since tort law was governed by a binary approach to 
liability and a comparative fault defense was yet to be recognized. Courts and legislatures 
rightly changed that.  And the same should be done in contract law.  
                                                                                                                                                 
40. This is the outcome when cooperation or avoiding over-reliance is low-cost and the 
probability of a breach without cooperation or avoidance of over-reliance is high. See the numerical 
example in Section I.B.1.c.  
41. Eisenberg, The Duty to Rescue in Contract Law, supra note (basing a contract-law duty 
to rescue on fairness considerations).  
42. This Article has assumed that both the breach of contract and the non-cooperation or 
over-reliance were observable and verifiable.  Yet, this is not always the case. When non-cooperation or 
over-reliance is not observable or verifiable, other mechanisms can be employed to provide both parties 
with efficient incentives. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Anti Insurance, 31 J. Leg. Stud. 203 
(2002) (proposing a mechanism for creating full liability for both the promissor and promissee and 
resulting in efficient incentives for both).  
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